NSA put (effective) backdoor in Dual_EC_DRBG: schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the…... Thread by someone directly involved on why the ISO rejected NSA ciphers in the past (hint: they refused to justify design decisions, lied, and attacked the credibility of people who had put out actually-secure crypto): twitter.com/TomerAshur/status/988696306… Either they're too incompetent to be trusted or are bad actors and should be treated as such.

What's also interesting is how the NSA admonished and personally attacked three cryptographers (including Daniel J. Bernstein aka djb) and called them incompetent: >the NSA's behavior was outrageously adversarial to the process. They refused to motivate design choices they made such as the choice of matrices U, V, and W in Simon's key schedule. Instead, they chose to personally attack some of the experts (including @hashbreaker, Orr Dunkelman and myself) as incompetent. >This is yet another example as to how the NSA's surveillance program is bad for global security. If they had been more trustworthy, or at least more cooperative, different alliances would have probably been formed. But instead, they chose to try to bully their way into the standards which almost worked but eventually backfired. Rest: twitter.com/TomerAshur/status/988696306…

"Political" arguments such as twitter.com/tomerashur/status/988696306… and twitter.com/hashbreaker/status/71988900… ?